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Abstract
This paper provides some evidence on one aspect of international
investment, the impacts of domestic tax policy on foreign direct investment in
the United States. The possible impacts, which are discussed in the firstsec-
tion, are complex. For example, an investment incentive which applies to both
domestic and foreign investors would be expected to result in an increased
foreign investment in the U.S.On the other hand, a savings incentive, which
has no direct impact on foreign investors, would nevertheless tend to increase
domestic investors' demand for capital assets, thereby driving down the returns
expected by foreign investors and possibly resulting in significant decreases in
foreign investment. Because of measurement difficulties, we are only partly
successful in obtaining precise estimates of this sort of impact.However, the
results we do obtain suggest that foreign investment in the U.S. isstrongly
affected, in the manner predicted, by changes in domestic tax policy.
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I. Introduction.
Tax policy toward international investment is an issue which has
occupied the attention of U.S. policyrnakers for many years. Until recently,
direct investment involving the United States was characterized by U.S. multina-
tional firms investing abroad. Thus, it is not surprising that, at the same
time that so much attention was being paid to U.S. tax policy toward foreign—
source income, very little attention was given to the impacts of domestic tax
policy on investment by foreigners in the United States. More recently,
however, foreign firms' investment in the United States has come to play a much
more important role in total U.S. capital formation. For instance, in 1979, net
direct investment by foreigners in their U.S. affiliates reached 11.9 billion
dollars, or approximately fifteen percent of total net plant and equipnent
expenditures in the United States.1
One recent paper (Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (1982)) has illustrated
the potential importance of foreign direct investment inflows for the outcomes
of tax policy. That paper demonstrated, using simulation analysis, that if
foreign investment is highly elastic, its impacts could come to dominate other
effects of tax changes on economic welfare. The reason is that the presence of
capital income taxes implies that the U.S. government shares in any returns to
capital generated by increases in foreigners' investments in the U.S.
While this theoretical work implies that the elasticity of inter-
national capital flows with respect to rates of return is a very important para-
meter in determining tax effects, almost no information is available concerning—2—
this crucial elasticity. In a previous empirical paper (Hartman (1981b)) it was
shown that domestic investment incentives, in addition to increasing total
investment by U.S. firms, tend to attract investment by these investors which
otherwise would have gone abroad. However, there has, as of yet, been no
empirical work on the responsiveness of foreigners' investments in the United
States to changes in domestic tax parameters.
Obtaining some evidence on the magnitude of this response i espe-
cially important at this time. Current tax policy in the United States appears
to be guided in a very important way by concerns with the rate of capital for-
mation. Thus, the 1981 tax reform was designed to put major emphasis on
increasing both the rate of savings and the rate of investment. In policy
discussions, and in fact in much of the economics literature on taxes and capi-
tal formation, savings incentives and investment incentives are treated as
alternative methods of achieving the same result.2
Once the presence of international capital movements is recognized,
however, savings incentives and investment incentives can assume very different
roles. Domestic investment incentives, for example, can result in large
increases in domestic investment by foreigners and by domestic firms, at the
expense of investment abroad, even if major increases in savings do not occur.
On the other hand, savings incentives could result in increased investment both
at home and abroad, thus causing domestic investment to increase by less than
the increase in savings.
This paper provides some evidence on one aspect of international
investment, the impacts of domestic tax policy on foreign direct investment in
the United States. The possible impacts, which are discussed in the first sec—tion, are complex. For example, an investment incentive which applies to both
domestic and foreign investors would be expected to result in an increased
foreign investment in the U.S.On the other hand, a savings incentive, which
has no direct impact on foreign investors, would nevertheless tend to increase
domestic investors' demand for capital assets, thereby driving down the returns
expected by foreign investors and possibly resulting in significant decreases in
foreign investment. Because of measurement difficulties, we must be modest
about the precision of our estimates of these impacts. However, the results we
do obtain suggest that foreign investment in the U.S. is strongly affected, in
the manner predicted, by changes in domestic tax policy.
II. Domestic Tax Effects on Foreign Investment Inflows
Our analysis of the effects of domestic tax policy on foreign invest-
ment will involve testing the traditional proposition that foreign investors
base their decisions on where to make capital investments on the real after—tax
rates of return available on alternative investments. In a simplified aggregate
model, we should use after—tax rates of return on foreigners' investments abroad
and in the U.S. to explain the level of foreign investment in the United
States.3 The complexity of each country's tax system, and, in particular, the
complexity of the interaction among tax systems, make this comparison far from
straightforward.
Because of the empirical orientation of this paper, we intend to
sketch only briefly the theory which underlies the response of foreign investors
to domestic taxes, with a goal of empirical implementation is an aggregate time
series model. Those interested in a more rigorous development of these ideas
should consult Hartman (1981a). In taxing the income earned in the U.S. by—4—
foreign investors, the U.S. government has the first opportunity and imposes its
corporate taxes on the firms' returns just as it would on a domestic investor's
income. When the income from these investments is actually repatriated as a
dividend to the foreign investor, an additional tax, called a "withholding tax"
is also typically collected. Then, the home government of the investor gets an
opportunity to tax the proceeds. In order to avoid the double taxation which
otherwise would be implied by the collection of the investor's home country tax,
the home nations typically either exclude foreign source income from taxation
completely or give the firm a credit for the U.S. taxes paid.
The effective rate of taxation, to which a foreign investor should
respond in making its U.S. investment decisions, is, therefore, a complicated
concept. In particular, the question of how a firm should view the deferred
taxes (the U.S. withholding tax as well as any residual home country tax) has
often been resolved in empirical studies by simply averaging the applicable tax
rates, with weights depending on the fraction of earnings ordinarily repatriated.
In the recent theoretical paper referred to above, we noted that the
repatriation of earnings to the foreign parent firm,whilethe foreign parent
firmisat the same time investing further n the U.S. by an explicit transfer
of funds, results in no change in the net financial position of either the
parent firm or the U.S. subsidiary, except that anytaxeswhich are levied on
repatriated earnings are paid currently rather than being deferred into the
future. Thus, it is optimal for the U.S subsidiary to obtain explicit transfers
of funds from the parent only if its planned investment in the U.S. is suf-
ficient to totally exhaust its current U.S. earnings. That is, one would not
expect to observe foreign parent firms making new investments in the U.S. while—5—
atthe same time receiving dividend payments from their U.S. affiliates. Thus,
the weighted average rule for calculating effective tax rates would appear to
have a fatal shortcoming. Rather, we can depict the required return on invest-
ment in the U.S. by foreign firms as shown in Figure 1, where E represents the
earnings available within the U.S. subsidiary for investment, and r2 exceeds
r1 for reasons to which we will now turn.
Suppose, first, that the firm is in the position of making a marginal
investment which would involve retaining earnings, rather than repatriating them
to the foreign parent. The general nature of the effective tax rate which
influences this decision can be most simply investigated by recognizing that the
present value of the liability coming from deferrable taxes is not affected by
the decision to defer them. That is, the present values of the taxes due on one
dollar, if repatriated today, or on one dollar plus all of the earnings that
that dollar generates in the intervening period, if repatriation occurs later,
are equal. The reason that deferral provides an advantage is that the further
earnings generated from a reinvested dollar do not accrue any additional real
tax liability as a result of withholding taxes and host country income taxes.
Thus, in deciding whether to reinvest earnings or repatriate earnings, an opti-
mizing firm should think of the effective tax rate on additional U.S. capital
income as arising only from the standard U.S. income tax.So, the appropriate
net—of—tax return on U.S. investment, to be compared to the net-of—tax return
available abroad, should be calculated ignoring withholding taxes imposed by the
U.S. and any additional tax liability imposed on dividend payments by the
foreign government.4








Investment in the U.S.—7--
does not have an accumulated foreign tax liability on those funds, and should
consider the fact that when it repatriates the resulting earnings it will face
additional withholding and foreign income taxes. The calculation of the after-
tax rate of return in this case is highly complex, depending upon the planned
timing of future repatriations. For example, if repatriation is expected to
occur at a very far distant point, the importance of that future tax liability
diminishes. Obviously, the future plans of the firm determine the value of
in Figure 1. Unfortunately, even setting the difficult conceptual issues
aside, problems of measurement will prevent us from constructing an effective
withholding tax rate and foreign income tax rate to be applied to the aggregate
of foreign investment in the U.S. At the same time, it does not seem too
unreasonable to assume, given the aggregate nature of our analysis, that the
average values of these tax rates might be relatively constant over time. If
so, ignoring these taxes in the empirical analysis will not present any
problems.
The reason for this very striking difference in the incentive effects
of taxe8 due upon repatriation in these two cases is intuitive. Since the
deferred taxes act more as levies on transfers of funds out of the United
States, rather than as taxes on the earnings of capital, they would be expected
to have very different effects depending on whether the funds are already in the
U.S. or whether a firm is contemplating transferring funds to the U.S. When the
funds are already in the hands of the domestic subsidiary, a tax on transferring
funds back to the parent firm becomes an unavoidable cost, and does not
influence the firm's optimal investment decision. On the other hand, the same
tax is avoidable if the funds are not already located in the U.S., and, there—-8-
fore, serves to some extent as an investment disincentive.
As noted above, we will be forced to ignore these deferrable taxes in
the empirical work in any event. A good argument can be made that this should
cause no difficulty; but it is still important to consider investment of
retained earnings separately from investment of new funds transferred from the
parent, since these marginal investment decisions are conceptually distinct.
One other conceptual distinction is particularly important in the case
of the United States. Foreign investment in the U.S. can take the form either
of new capital expenditures by foreign investors or of purchase of existing
assets. Both of these fonns of investment appear to be very important in the
U.S. case and, reliable data do not exist to separate the two forms. It is
nevertheless important to maintain a logical distinction between these two forms
of investment is in considering how to measure real after—tax rates of return on
assets in the United States. For firms expanding the operations of existing
subsidiaries by making new capital investments, the current rate of return to
foreign—owned assets in the United States would be expected to provide a better
measure of the anticipated rate of return to new assets than some rate of return
measured for the economy as a whole. Specifically, the foreign firm might
possess some advantage in its product, technology, or management which has
allowed it to earn a current rate of return higher than that generally pre-
vailing in the economy. This higher rate of return will be an inducement to
further investment. Conversely, the measured rate of return most applicable to
a firma which is buying existing assets would seem to be the overall rate of
return to assets in the U.S. In fact, in the empirical analysis to follow, both
a general net real rate of return and a foreign—investor—specific rate of return—9-
will be allowed to influence foreign investment.
More importantly, when a firm is considering purchase of existing
assets, its decisions will be influenced by the valuation placed on those
existing assets by U.S. domestic investors. As a result, a change in domestic
tax policy, such as an inducement to savings, which changes the attractiveness
of assets without necessarily changing the current measured net real rate of
return to the capital can influence foreign investors' decisions.
III. The Evidence.
The theory developed in the proceeding section leads to an estimating




Aswe noted in Section II, the marginal investment decisions of firms which
are reinvesting earnings at the margin could be affected differently (by taxes)
from the marginal investment decisions being made by firms which are trans-
ferring funds from abroad at the margin. Thus, equation (1) will have coef-
ficients which are particular to retained earnings investment (Ire) .An
equation with the same variables will be used to explain "transfer" investment
(Ii). In our estimation, retained earnings investment will 'be taken as a frac-
tion of U.S. GNP. This is done to allow for better comparison with previous
results on domestic investment, although the alternative of using investment
deflated by the GNP deflator produces virtually identical (though marginally
more significant) results.
In this equation, i&(1_t*) is the after—tax rate of return actually—10—
realized by foreign investors in the U.S. As pointed out above, this rate of
return is most appropriate for firms which are considering expansion of current
operations (which may or may not be earning rates of return comparable to those
in the rest of the U.S. economy). Since an increase in the rate of return
earned in the U.S. tends to increase investment, we would expect a1 to be posi-
tive.
The second term in equation (1), r(1_t*) is the overall gross rate of
return on capital in the United States, reduced by the U.S. tax rate paid on
current income by a foreign investor. This variable measures a similar concept
to that measured by r*(1 _t*)
,exceptthat it may be more applicable to firms
which are acquiring existing assets on which they do not expect to earn extraor-
dinary returns based on production of differentiated products or possession of
superior technology. We would, of course, anticipate that the coefficient of
this alternative measure of the U.S. rate of return, a2 ,wouldalso take on a
positive sign.
The final term in equation (1), ),measuresthe tax rate on U.S.
capital owned by foreigners (t*), relative to the tax rate on U.S. capital owned
by U.S. investors, (t) ,orequivalently, the net-of—tax rate of return received
by domestic investors relative to that received by foreigners, on the same
investment. t is appropriately measured to include all taxes on capital; in
particular, it includes taxes paid by the final recipients of the capital
income. This ratio, therefore, measures the attractiveness of a U.S. investment
to a domestic investor, relative to its attractiveness to a foreign investor.
By including this term, we hope to capture the valuation effect discussed in the
previous section: the tax change which causes an investment to become more—1 1—
attractive to a domestic investor but causes no change in the effective tax rate
faced by a foreign investor tends, in the short run, to increase the foreigners'
cost of acquiring that investment and, thus, tends to reduce foreign investment.5
Therefore, we would expect a3 to be negative.
In addition to the limitations of our analysis caused by lack of data
and discussed in the previous section, there is one further notable omission
from equation (1). That is, we have no measure of the alternative rate of
return available abroad to those contemplating foreign investment in the U.S.
While one could construct a measure of the after—tax real rate of return
available in a particular country to a particular investor who is resident of a
particular second country, the complexity and uncertainty involved in attempting
to construct an aggregate (marginal) measure seems unlikely to produce any
useable results. Rather than make any attempt in this direction, we have chosen
to accept the left—out variable problem. However, it seems unlikely that even
the ideal aggregate rate of return would show sufficient variability over time
to be very important if it were measurable. Furthermore, as long as the
variations in the alternative rate of return are not highly correlated with
variations in those factors included in equation (1), no bias will be produced
in the estimates of the coefficients of equation (1 )byhaving left it out. If
anything, one would anticipate that real after—tax rates of return to capital
across countries would be positively correlated. Therefore, since we would
expect the coefficient of the alternative rate of return variable to be
negative, any bias produced in the coefficients a1 and a2 should be in the
direction of making them less significant. In addition, we will conduct some
further experiments, estimating directly the tax effects embodied in equation—12—
(1).This should provide useful information, since the variations in U.S. tax
rates seem even less likely to be correlated with events occurring abroad.
A. Retained Earnings Results
Investment of retained earnings is highly important, accounting for
well over forty percent of' total foreign investment over the period of obser-
vation. We should anticipate getting our best results for the retained earnings
equation, since the measured rate of return will best reflect the experience of
"mature" subsidiaries which are likely to use reinvested earnings as their
marginal source of capital.6
Estimating equation (1 )usingannual time series data for the 15 year
period (1965—1979), produces the result given by equation (2).
(2) ln() =-6.573+1.436ln(r*(1_t*)) +1.232ln(r(1_t*)) -1.720ln() (.679) (.118) (.376) (.415)
=.940
(standard errors in parentheses) DW =1.67
SER =.096
This result demonstrates that the very simple model of the foreign investment
decision we have presented above provides for a fairly good explanation of
variations in retained earnings investment. In addition, despite the measure-
ment problems discussed above, the three factors we have isolated as being
important in our theoretical discussion are all shown by equation (2) to be
highly significant explainers of retained earnings investment.-13-
In particular, each of the two real after tax rate of return
variables, the measure specific to foreign investors andthemeasure for the
U.S. economy as a whole, contributes significantly. This result seems to indi-
cate the importance of both "traditional foreign investment" (the exploitation
by foreign firms of firm—specific advantages in production) and what might be
called "large portfolio investment" (the purchase of sufficiently large shares
of existing operations to be classified as foreign direct investment, but
without anticipation of extraordinary rates of return) in the recent U.S.
experience. Alternatively, it could simply be the case that both rates of
return contain some information on a given investment's potential.
Furthermore, the significance of the relative tax term indicates that
a decline in the tax rate faced 'by an individual U. S. saver, relative to the
tax rate faced by a foreign investor tends to cause a decrease in the level of
foreign investment. Thus, all of our ex ante hypotheses concerning the impact
of tax policy on foreign direct investment are strongly confirmed by the results
just presented.
As mentioned in footnote 5, the potential for correlation of measure-
ment errors in r(i_t*) and 're cannot be dismissed. Instrumental variables
estimation, the usual prescription for such a problem, strongly confirms the
substantive conclusions of the previous result. Despite the fact that x(1_t*)
was instrumented by its one—year lagged value, and that the correlation between
the return and its lagged value have a correlation of only .78, the result is
very similar to that given by equation (2):—14—
(3)in()=-6.864+1.589ln(r*(1_t*)) +1.548ln(r(1_t*)) -2.020ln((1_t))




To further explore the magnitude of the errors—in-variables problem,
an equation was estimated using the reinvestment ratio, (Ire divided by foreign
investor's U.S. earnings (E)) as the dependent variable. Since it is the errors
in earnings, which are incorporated in both 're and r*(l_t*), the behavior
I
of an equation explaining should be unsatisfactory if the results shown
above are purely the product of bias. However, the coefficients obtained are
entirely consistent with those in equation (2).
(4) 1n() =2.386+.275ln(r*(1_t*)) +1.045ln(r(1_t*)) -1.6021n() E





Since the impacts of U.S. taxes are the prime concern of this paper,
it is useful to provide additional confirmation that it is really net of tax
rates of return to which foreign investors are responding. This is done, as is
shown in equation (5)byestimating separately, whenever possible, the effects
of the various tax parameters.—15—
(5) 1n() =-6.559+1.434ln(r*(1_t*)) +1.230ln(r) -1.727ln(1-t') +2.984ln(1_t*)




It should again be noted that observations of r(1_t*) are obtained without
any independent estimation of t .Thus,in order not to introduce error into
this variable, we leave r*(1_t*) intact. By contrast, r and t are esti-
mated independently, so the gross rate of return to capital in the U.S. and the
tax rate facing foreign investors in the U.S. are included separately to test
specifically for the tax effects.
This equation strongly confirms that after—tax rates of return are the
appropriate variable, with all of the coefficients in the equation (3) being
significant. In addition, it should be noted that the coefficient of ln(1_t*)
is virtually identical to the coefficients which were implied by the original
functional form.Thatis, the coefficient of ln(1_t*) is nearly equal to the
coefficient of ln(r) minus that of ln(1—t').
With the estimated impacts of taxes on retained earnings investment
therefore strongly confirmed, it remains to explore the empirical significance
of these impacts for the level of foreign investment in the U.S. First,
however, we turn to the estimation of the relationship between tax rates and
the other half of foreign investment, that accomplished by means of funds trans-
ferred from abroad (It)
B. Results on Transfers from Abroad
As noted above, the theory dictates inclusion of a measure of the—16—
additional foreign tax liability which would be due upon the date of
repatriation of earnings from these investments. However, time series infor-
mation required to construct such a variable is not available. In addition, it
is plausible to believe that over our 15-year time period the average tax rate
in the rest of the world did not change significantly. Thus, we proceed to
estimate an equation of the form of equation (i) for investment accomplished by
funds transfers. The result is given by equation (6).
(6) ln() =—8.535+.552ln(r*(1t*)) +1.674ln(r(1_t*)) -2.329




It should be immediately noted that our model does not explain Ij
nearly as well as it explains 're
•Thisshould not be surprising, given the
variety of motivations which could lie behind foreign investment in newer opera-
tions (those which are not yet generated sufficient funds to finance further
investment). In particular, we can again appeal to the traditional factors used
to explain foreign investment, such as differentiation in products, technology,
and management, which, for newer investors, would not be well captured by any of
the variables in our model. Despite these reservations, however, it should be
noted that all three coefficients are significant at the .05 level in a one—tail
test. Again, the notion that taxes affect foreign investment is confirmed.
Furthermore, the pattern of coefficients, relative to those found in the case of
're is just the one that would be anticipated. Namely, the coefficient of
ln(r*(1_t*)) is a good deal lower, reflecting the fact that existing foreign—17-
investment does not provide as good a guide to the returns anticipated on "new
investment." The in (r(1_t*)) coefficient, by contrast, is larger than in
the previous case, reflecting that "new investments" may be anticipated to yield
an amount more closely related to the overall yield in the economy; this conclu-
sion is reinforced by the fact that the in -f--2.)coefficientis larger in
absolute value than that found in the previous case.
As in the previous case, we seek to confirm these conclusions by
reestimating the equation with tax effects estimated separately. The results,
shown in equation (7), do not add much confidence to the previous result.
(7) ln() =-10.185+.808ln(r*(1_t*)) +1.989ln(r) -1.480ln(l-t') +.202ln(1_t*)




In particular, the coefficients of ln(1—t) and ln(1_t*) are not signifi-
cant in this case. Particularly at odds with our expectations the coefficient
of ln(1_t*) ,whichwould be anticipated to equal approximately the coef-
ficient of ln(r) minus that of ln(1—t) or about 3.469. The failure of
these tax variables to perform more significantly in the equation is better
understood when it is recognized that the correlation between t and t*
equals .95. While this correlation was not sufficiently high to make the
results unreliable in an equation which fit as well as the 're equation
(equation (2)), it is sufficiently high to destroy any confidence in separate
coefficients estimated in an equation fitting no better than equation (7).
While the coefficients of equation (7) do not add further confirmation of (6),-18-
neither do they provide evidence which rejects the hypothesis that the func-
tional forms should be as in equation (6). Thus, we would view equation (6) as
confirming the theory we have advanced about the effects of taxes on foreign
investment.
In general, the estimated effects of taxes on foreign investment, both
that accomplished by reinvestment of earnings and that accomplished by explicit
transfers of funds, are found to be quite strong. The results indicate that
a change in U.S. tax policy which tends to diminish the tax rate faced by
foreigners (for example, a decrease in foreign or state corporate income taxes),
provides strong encouragement to increase foreign investment in the U.S. At the
same time, a change in U.S. tax policy which increases the attractiveness of
U.S. capital investment to domestic savers (for example, a decrease in the tax
rate on interest or dividends received or on capital gains), tends to provide a
strong discincentive to foreign investment, by raising the domestic valuation of
domestic assets. The amount by which foreign investment would be expected to
respond to specific changes in tax policy will be explored in the next section.
First, further experiments, designed to rule out some possibilities that these
results are spurious, will be described,.
It has already been noted that making some crude attempts to adjust
for mismeasurement in capital consumption allowances and inventory valuations
which go into determining the reported value of r*(1_t*) have virtually no
effect on the results. Similarly, the use of instrumental variables estimations
to overcome problems of measurement error in r*(i_t*) do not alter the
conclusion. nother matter of some concern in a simple time series analysis
such as this is the possibility that our regression results are a product of—19—
explaining variables having a strong trend by other strongly trending variables.
Casual observation of values of the variables included in our regressions tends
to discount this possibility. However, in order to be more certain of our
results, all of the regressions (2) —(7)were rerun including first a linear
trend and then a logarithmic trend. In no case were any of these trend
variables significant and in no case did they alter in any way our basic
conclusions.
Finally, several other events which occurred during this period might
have been important to those contemplating foreign investment in the U.S. Not
including those other variables introduces the possibility of bias in the coef-
ficients which are of interest. So, several alternative specifications were
tried in both the 're and the 1t equations. In 1974, a Middle Eastern oil
producing nation made a large investment in a U.S. firm, to acquire assets
located in its country. This investment was originally recorded as a foreign
direct investment in the United States, but was thereafter removed from the
statistics. Since 1974 was by all accounts an unusual year in international
economic affairs, the equations were all rerun including a dummy variable to
remove the 1974 observation from consideration. This variable was clearly
insignificant in all cases and did not produce any significant change in any
other parameter. Also occurring during our period of observation were disloca-
tions in international financial markets during the period of fixed exchange
rates and in the change to floating exchange rates. Speculative flows of capi-
tal between nations in anticipation of parity changes could have shown up in the
foreign investment figures. Thus, we have included in the model a variable
suggested by Kohihagen (1977) to reflect speculation in the capital market.
Again, this variable did not achieve significance, and produced no important-20-
changes in other coefficients. Thus, through all of these alterations
to the basic model, the results have been shown to be highly robust.
III. The Impacts of Tax Changes.
We now turn to simulation experiments involving basic changes in the
tax parameters t and t .First,t ,thecapital tax facing foreigners
investing in the U.S. (federal corporate tax, state and local corporate tax, and
state and local property tax) is reduced by ten percentage points to determine
the impact on foreign investment. A ten percentage point decrease in t would,
according to the Feldstein, Poterba, and Dicks-Mireaux figures used in this
paper, amount to: a) a cut by about one third of the effective rate of federal
corporate tax, b) approximately a complete removal of the state and local pro-
perty tax, or c) about double the impact of removing state and local corporate
taxes. Such a change would have, according to our model, increased reinvestment
of earnings by affiliated subsidiaries by about .98 billion dollars in 1979, or
just over one quarter. Similarly, explicit transfers of capital from abroad
would have increased by about .95 billion dollars or about sixteen percent. It
turns out, therefore, that a ten percentage point tax reduction, which transla-
tes into a decline in the total rate of, tax collection on foreign source income
of 20.9 percent produces, through all of the mechanisms we have described, an
aggregate increase of about 20.39 percent in the annual total net direct invest-
ment undertaken by foreigners in the United States. Thus, one would expect to
observe a slight decrease in the amount of U.S. taxes collected on foreign
source income, if such a tax cut were implemented, everything else equal.
As an example of a tax cut which induces Americans to find capital
investment more attractive, while foreigners see no similar incentive, suppose—21—
that the tax on interest income was completely eliminated. This, according to
Feldstein, Poterba, and Dicks—Mireaux, would amount to au eight percentage point
cut in the total taxation of corporate capital income in the United States.
According to our model, such a cut would produce approximately a 1.2 billion
dollar decrease in investment through reinvested earnings, coupled with a
decline of 3.13 billion dollars in capital directly transferred from abroad.
These figures, it should be noted, are much larger than those resulting from a
change in the corporate income tax, because of the asymmetric effects on foreign
and domestic investors.
In general, the reader must be cautioned against taking these results
as anything other than illustrative. The models on which they are based are
very simple ones, which describe a yearly flow of net investment. While this
methodology is comparable to that used for similar purposes in the domestic
literature (see, for example, Feldstein (forthcoming)), it is not particularly
well suited to describing the eventual outcome of the changes in policy, after
all adjustments take place. The conclusions, though, are highly suggestive.
IV. Conclusions
It has long been recognized that if international flows of capital are
highly elastic, the welfare consequences of domestic tax policy could be quite
different from those derived from a closed economy model. Recent work by
Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (1982) has highlighted the potential significance
of these effects. While there are general equilibrium effects to consider, one
is not, in general, badly mislead by thinking of these effects as arising
because, when foreigners invest in the United States, the United States govern-
ment collects a fraction of the rate of return to the capital in the form of tax——
revenue.Preliminary figures for the year 1980 indicate that foreign investors
earned approximately 9.3billionafter—tax dollars on investments in the United
States. Thus, among federal, state, and local governments, around 9 billion
dollars in tax collections in that year must have been attributable to capital
provided by foreigners. Given the modest levels of welfare gain usually attri-
buted to proposed changes in tax policy in a closed economy model, it is not
implausible that welfare gains or losses attributable to resulting changes in
foreign direct investment, could loom very large in one's welfare calculations.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the welfare effects arising
from the change in foreign direct investment could be small, since the increase
in annual foreign investment almost exactly balances the decline in tax revenue
produced by the decline in the tax rate. Our result is, therefore, intermediate
between: 1) the situation in which foreign investment is not at all responsive
to taxes, in which case a welfare loss of perhaps one billion dollars would be
generated by a ten percentage point cut in the effective corporate tax rate (an
amount which foreign parent firms would receive as a windfall) and 2) the alter-
native situation in which a ten percentage point cut in the corporate income tax
rate would generate a massive inflow of capital, which would produce very large
welfare gains. Similarly, our results are indicative that an improved incentive
to savings in the U.S. can be expected to produce, at least temporarily, a
decline in foreign investment, which tends to produce an economic welfare loss
for the economy. By our estimates, this savings incentive effect on foreign
investment could be quite large, implying that any welfare gains anticipated by
conventional models need to be weighed against welfare losses arising from the
foreign sector, which could potentially amount to several billion dollars.—25—
Whileall these welfare calculations are highly preliminary in nature,
what seems to be unambiguous in our results is that foreign investment does
respond significantly to domestic tax policy. Recent changes in U.S. domestic
tax policy include both incentives to increase investment operating on the cor-
porate income tax side and incentives for savings operating on the individual
side. By most accounts, the tax rate cuts for individuals, aside from that
affecting the top bracket of taxpayers, are modest at best. On the other hand,
the investment incentives embodied in the new accelerated depreciation provi-
sions seem to represent drastic changes in the tax treatment of corporate
income. Thus, unless top bracket taxpayers act to very significantly bid up the
prices of existing assets in the short run, one would anticipate major increases
in foreign direct investment in the United States over the coming years, rela-
tive to what would have happened without the tax changes.—24-
FOOTNOTES
1. Foreign direct investment, as distinguished from portfolio investment, takes
place in a domestic operation over which the foreign parent firm has control.
For several reasons, foreign direct investment figures cannot be thought of as
the precise equivalent of net domestic investment numbers. One difference is
that the net domestic investment figures are obtained by subtracting from gross
investment a depreciation figure adjusted to approximate as closely as possible
economic depreciation. The Commerce Department collects no data which would
allow it to adjust the book depreciation figures used in computing net foreign
investment, and only the roughest adjustments to be discussed below can be made.
In addition, foreign direct investment is most accurately thought of
as a financial transaction: an implicit or explicit supply of parent firm funds
to a U.S. affiliate. To the extent that additional funds are borrowed in the
U.S. or supplied by "minority" owners, these figures understate the investment
undertaken in the U.S. which is under the control of foreigners. On the other
hand, foreign direct investment does not necessarily mean purchase of real
assets and, so, may overstate the foreign—owned equivalent of domestic net fixed
investment. However, the tendency of local financing to be short—term (Robbins
and Stobaugh (1973), Chapter 4) and the incentive to minimize exchange risk by
financing current assets, but not fixed assets, through short term local
borrowing (Robbins and Stobaugh (1972)), both imply that foreign direct invest—
nient in the U.S. may be an adequate indicator of the net fixed investment
figure.Confirmation that this approximation holds very closely in the case of
investmentundertakenabroad by U.S. firms can be found in Hartman (1981b).
Thus, even though data limitations force us to follow the usual practice of—25—
using foreign direct investment figures as if they represented net fixed
investment (see, for example, Goldaborough (1979)), there is some evidence to
support this procedure.
2. See, for example, Summers (1981) and Bradford (1981).
3.Furtherjustification for the theory sketched here can be found inHartman
(1981b).
4. For a discussion of the limited exceptions to this simple rule, see Hartman
(1981b).
5.Becausethe rate of return to domestic capital is based on replacement
costs, these valuation changes are not captured by r(1_t*).
6.In fact, there is the possibility that the performance of this equation will
bedeceptively good, reflecting a specification error. As the data description
infootnote6 indicates, any measurement error in earnings will 'be introduced as
error not only in the dependent variable, retained earnings, but also in our
measure of the domestic rate of return on foreign assets. That is, there could
be a spurious correlation between an independent variable and the residual. It
turns out that instrumental variables estimates (instrumenting r*(1_t*) by its
lagged value) do not differ in any important way from the ordinary least squares
estimates reported here.
7.Thesources for data are as follows: r*(l_t*) is "reinvested earnings" plus
"income from interest, dividends, and earnings of unincorporated affiliates"
(both from "Balance of Payments" tables in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of—26--
EconomicAnalysis, Survey of Current Business, selected issues), divided by
"direct investment position" (from "Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States," Survey of Current Business, selected issues). No separate estimate of
t is available from the source which provides information on &(1_t*). In
constructing the other variables, r, t (equal to the sum of the rates of cor-
porate income tax imposed at all jurisdictions plus property taxes), and t (the
total effective tax rate including t and tax rates facing savers) are all
taken from Feldstein, Poterba, and Dicks—Mireaux (1981), Thus, we are
recognizing that the effective tax rates facing domestic investors and those
imposed on foreign investors subject to the same taxes are equal. Note that the
measureof t inherent in r(1 _t*) and the measure of t used to construct
r(1_t*) are independent.
Itshould also be noted that the concepts measured byr(1_t*) and
r*(1_t*)are somewhat different in their treatment of firm debt. While r
includes the return to the entire debt portion of the firms' capital, r*(1_t*)
includes the debt return only to the extent that the debt is foreign—owned.
8. As further confirmation of our results, rates of return were adjusted in a
crude fashion for mismeasurement of real depreciation and inventory profits
(using the percentage impacts on domestic firm's earnings of these adjustment,
as reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis in
the Survey' of Current Business, various isues). This adjustment made no percep-
tible difference in parameter estimates.—27—
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